As part of the structural adjustment programme the Government of India, in 1997, introduced the Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) with the objective of targeting the food subsidies to the poor and reducing fiscal deficit. While the universal Public Distribution System (PDS) had several limitations, the Targeted PDS has only worsened the problem of 'adequate access to food' for the poor. This article examines the limitations of income targeting based on the official poverty line under the TPDS. The article argues that the TPDS has worked counter-productively to the policy objective of reaching the poor. As per the National Sample Survey (1999)(2000) and the National Family Health Survey (1998-9), a significant proportion of the poor and food insecure suffer from severe malnutrition and calorific deprivation. With a large section of the population falling out of the TPDS the article suggests policy alternatives to ensure better 'access to food' for the poor and vulnerable.
Introduction
A country is truly food secure only when it is able to provide adequate food to all its citizens as matter of right, 'without inflicting any humiliation on the poor' (Parikh, 1998) . Ensuring sustainable access to food 1 for all households has been one of the most formidable challenges faced by India since independence. While there has been vast improvement in the production and procurement of foodgrains, institutional arrangements of reaching this food at affordable prices to the poor has been a matter of policy concern. In terms of food grain production India displayed impressive growth in the 1990s. Food grain procurement leapt from an average of 20 million tonnes per year in 1991-7 to 25 million tonnes in of income targeting and discusses possible alternatives vis-a-vis the TPDS; finally it suggests policy interventions for strengthening the targeted PDS.
The Public Distribution in India -An Overview
The Public Distribution System (PDS) in India is a state-administered food subsidy programme. Historically, the objectives 6 of the PDS have been: maintaining price stability, raising the welfare of the poor (by providing access to basic foods at reasonable prices to the vulnerable population), rationing during situations of scarcity, and keeping a check on private trade. The PDS was set up following the Bengal famine in 1943 and was launched in its present form in the early 1960s. The PDS has been an official instrument for reaching the poor section of society with the objective of improving household food security. Eligible households are provided a ration card that entitles them to buy select food items through a network of fair price shops. Rice, wheat and other select food items are made available through the PDS, which has a network of over 450,000 retail outlets nationwide (Farrington and Saxena, 2002) .
The PDS is operated under the joint responsibility of the Central and State governments, with the former responsible for procurement, storage, transportation and bulk allocation of foodgrains. The state governments in turn are responsible for distributing these foodgrains to consumers through a network of Fair Price Shops including the supervision and monitoring of the functioning of these shops. The PDS is partly implemented through the Food Corporation of India (FCI), which was set up in 1965 as part of the Agricultural Prices Commission. Commodities are procured primarily through the Food Corporation of India, which operates a vast network of warehouses and distribution centres, but also operates through private agents. Until 1997 households both in urban and rural areas with a registered residential address were entitled to subsidized food grains. As part of economic reforms 7 in 1997 the government introduced the Targeted PDS (TPDS).
Policy Change -The Targeted PDS
For developing economies in the context of limited resources an important way of reducing fiscal deficit is by cutting subsidies and targeting them exclusively to the poor. In India the shift in policy was made to target the subsidy to households living below the 'official poverty line' 8 (Table 1) .
The Targeted PDS (TPDS) required that states undertake surveys to identify Below Poverty Line (BPL) and Above Poverty Line (APL) families, using absolute income lines issued by the Planning Commission based on official poverty lines in 1993-4. As per the Ministry of Consumer Affairs and Public Food Distribution (Government of India, 1997), 'States (were) required to formulate and implement fool proof arrangements 12 for identification of the Mane: Targeting the Poor or Poor Targeting poor for delivery of foodgrains and for its distribution in a transparent and accountable manner through the fair price shops'. In doing so, says the Committee of Food subsidies 'that thrust, should be to include the really poor and vulnerable sections'. In addition, other qualitative criteria were also adopted such as household occupation, land operated or owned, housing conditions, number of earners, and possession of various types of durables such as TV, refrigerators, motor cycles, tractors and so on. However, the surveys have missed out many poor families (Srivastava, 2004) .
In addition, several practical administrative problems exist in implementing this definition of poverty as there are no regular official estimates of the actual income of households. As the CAG 13 A study of the TPDS in Uttar Pradesh by the World Bank based on the UPBihar Survey of Living Conditions conducted in 1997-8, found that 56 per cent of households in the lowest quintile and 63 per cent of households in the next quintile did not get BPL cards. 16 Comparing the data 17 from the National Sample Survey (NSS) 55th round (for 1999-2000) as well as from the NSS 50th round (for 1993-4), the High Level
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Journal of Asian and African Studies 41(4) transferred per household per month for BPL population was between Rs. 22 to Rs. 46 across different states. 22 Further, while the procurement of foodgrains increased by 117 per cent (from 19.6 to 42.7) between 1991 and 2001, public distribution of foodgrains dropped drastically by 37 per cent (from 20.8 to 13.2) during the same period ( Table 3 ), indicating that significant households were excluded from the system.
One of the objectives of the TPDS was to reduce subsidies. In 2001-2, out of the total food subsidy only 25.7 per cent was targeted towards BPL and 2.3 per cent towards APL households, while the subsidy towards carrying cost 23 alone was 66.5 per cent. We have seen that prices of both rice and wheat went up significantly, implying that the net subsidy to the poor was reduced due to 'poor targeting' and 'rise in prices'. However, the total subsidies (Table 4) increased by 76 per cent in real terms and by 52 per cent as a percentage of the total government expenditure from 1996-7 and to 2002-3. This ballooning of total subsidy 24 is on account of the sharp rise in stocks, and the accompanying rise in carrying costs. It is evident that the introduction of the TPDS has not reduced food subsidy.
Nutritional Status and Incidence of Hunger
This section of the article analyses the nutritional status in the country because nutritional estimates can help in conceptualizing the overall wellbeing of the population and in assessing the level of food security at household level. Here, the aim is not to suggest a causal impact between poorly Targeted PDS and inadequate nutritional status of the population in general. Nutritional estimates indicate the enormity of the problem and suggest that if implementation of TPDS is adequately streamlined it could make a positive impact on the nutritional status of the poor in particular in the long run. The National Family Health Survey 1998-9 reports that, 'half of all Indian children are undernourished, and about half of all adult women suffer from anemia, the burden of undernourishment is distributed very unequally across the population whereby the condition of women, children, and tribals is particularly alarming ' (Right to Food Campaign, 2003) . As per the NSS data 25 on nutritional intake in India there has been a long-term decline in per capita calorie consumption on average. In 1999-2000 in rural areas the mean daily calorie intake was 2000 while as per norms it should be 2400 (Chandrasekhar and Ghosh, 2000) . There is a lot of regional variation in average calorie intake, and calorie deprivation ( The worst affected are the poorest of the poor -the labour households. Households both from farm and non-farm labour form the largest chunk of occupation class suffering from hunger, both seasonal and chronic. It is important to note that a large segment of labour households is constituted by the backward castes 27 (Table 6 ) and these social classes suffer most from hunger, both in rural and urban India (Sagar, 2003) .
There are several estimates about malnutrition and starvation in India. The FAO in its report 'The State of Food Insecurity in the World' (2003) (available at http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/docrep/006/j0083e/ j0083e00.htm) has estimated that the number of hungry people in India increased by 19 million from 1997-2001. Gill et al. (2003) estimate that 'hunger tends to be chronic rather than acute, with 233 million (1998) (1999) (2000) undernourished in calorific and micronutrient terms (against 215 million in 1990-2), with particular problems among women, adolescent girls and under-fives while undernourishment is severe among Scheduled Castes'. In yet another study (Saxena, 2002) 
explains:
Malnutrition is widespread, with 207 million people in 1996-8 unable to access enough food to meet basic nutritional needs, over 50% of children below five years are underweight, with girls suffering particularly badly, and anaemia prevalent among almost 50% of women in the age group of 20-49 years.
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Journal of Asian and African Studies 41(4) All these estimates refer to one single fact: that hunger 29 and malnutrition are prevalent on a mass scale in India, and there are still areas in the country where deaths by starvation 30 occur every year.
Poor Targeting -Exclusion Errors!
In the context of limited public resources targeting is often presented as a means of giving more to the poor. The overall impact of a programme depends both on the number of poor households covered and the level of benefits they receive (Coady et al., 2003) . Let us now review the findings of two independent research studies to understand the errors of targeting in two States of India. Dutta and Ramaswami 31 (2001) have compared two States, 32 Andhra Pradesh which has a greater outreach of PDS (57 per cent households) and Maharashtra 33 where PDS has a limited outreach (33 per cent households). It is evident ( Table 7) that T2 -errors of wrong exclusion -are very high in Maharashtra, 49.9 per cent in the rural sector and 51.34 per cent in the urban sector, indicating that errors of exclusion tend to be higher in a narrowly targeted programme like the one in Maharashtra to a near universal programme as in the case of Andhra Pradesh. 34 The second study by Swaminathan and Mishra (2001) refers to the dangers of narrow targeting. This study was conducted in Maharashtra first in 1995 and later in 2000 before and after the introduction of the TPDS. This study attests the fact (Table 8 ) that with the policy shift from universal to TPDS and the introduction of income-based targeting errors of wrong exclusion increased substantially.
There are large welfare costs linked with wrong exclusion of the poor. For the poor and the food insecure 'exclusion errors' would translate into malnutrition and starvation -it could well become a matter of survival. 35 Mane Table 9 ). Households that earn income from farm and non-farm casual work or selfemployment most often face fluctuations in income over time -their incomes are often irregular, seasonal and unrecorded. The poor suffer a loss of income 39 when rains fail because not only do they lose employment opportunity but food prices also increase. In a country where more than 70 per cent of the population living in rural areas is exposed to similar vulnerability, even when proxy income indicators are used to determine poverty 40 they fail to capture real poverty. A 308 Journal of Asian and African Studies 41(4) If the official poverty line is compared with nutritional estimates it appears that a large size of the 'food insecure' population remains untargeted. According to the NSS data 70 per cent or more of the total population consumed less than 2100 calories in all available years since 1993-4 (HLC, 2002). Alternatively if food share is taken as an indicator then NSS data for 1999-2000 on consumption expenditure show that the food share was over 60 per cent for the lower 80 per cent of rural households and lower 40 per cent of urban households (HLC, 2002) . This implies that the proportion of persons suffering deprivations in food and nutrition is higher than those below the poverty line, indicating that targeting of food with reference to poverty lines can be counter-productive. Besides totally disregarding people living on the threshold of poverty line, income targeting is likely to exclude a large part of the nutritionally vulnerable population, thus denying access to subsidized food to those who need it the most. Targeting on the basis of income appears inappropriate because it does not effectively distinguish the food insecure from the food secure. In the context of food security income targeting appears unsuitable also because it deals with contingencies that cannot be perfectly foreseen. Alternative targeting mechanisms are discussed later in the article.
Problems with the Delivery Mechanism
One of the assumptions while introducing targeting is that with an appropriate targeting mechanism in place the existing delivery mechanism will be able to effectively reach out to the poor. However, besides the problem of identification of the poor and the food insecure, poor targeting mechanism and exclusion of large numbers of the poor the TPDS also suffers from chronic delivery and management shortcomings, for example, inadequate systems of distribution, storage and procurement. Many of these problems arise from systemic corruption prevalent in the delivery channels responsible for operating the PDS. A former Central Vigilance Commissioner (Vittal, 2002) supports his assertion that in India 'corruption is anti poor' by stating that '31 per cent of the food grains and 36% of the sugar meant for the (PDS), which is designed to provide food security to the people below the poverty line, gets diverted to the black market' (Jenkins and Goetz, 2002) . According to a study conducted by Tata Economic Consultancy Services in 2000, about one-third of the TPDS supplies for example, 31 per cent of rice and 36 per cent of wheat were diverted and did not reach the intended beneficiaries (HLC, 2002 (Jenkins and Goetz, 2002) in monitoring the PDS's activities could be a potential solution (Srinivas and Abdul Thaha, 2004) .
Policy Interventions for Strengthening the TPDS
India's nutrition problem thus is not lack of foodgrains at the national level but a lack of adequate access to food at the household level (Shariff and Mallick, 1999) . The various issues discussed in this article suggest that there is a need to reform the Targeted PDS (TPDS). The public distribution system (PDS) has several problems and limitations -the biggest one is its inadequacy in relation to the scale of hunger and vulnerability in India. The problem of poor targeting is of high priority given the scale of malnutrition and chronic hunger that exists in India. There is a need to identify effective and efficient ways of providing food to those who need it. Minimizing the 'errors of wrong exclusion' should be critical to future reform process. The TPDS could be redesigned to impact the poor in a positive manner (Figure 3 ). 
Conclusion
The need for targeting is motivated by the intention of maximizing the benefits of the subsidy to the poor and making efficient use of available resources. In reality, where targeting is inappropriate and poorly designed, the shift from a near universal scheme to a targeted one can leave the poor worse off than before. The rationale for adopting a targeted approach in delivering food subsides in India is to target the subsidies to the poor but it is evident that 'benefits meant for the poor often end up being poor benefits' (Sen, 1995) . In some ways the 'PDS would be meaningful only if the system translates the macro-level self-sufficiency in food grains . . . into micro-level self-sufficiency'. 50 In the era of structural adjustment it is virtually impossible for the government to revert to universal public distribution system (PDS) but if subsidy has to really reach the poor then income targeting is certainly not an effective alternative. This could be achieved not just by introducing appropriate targeting mechanism but by integrating it with improved monitoring and sustainable delivery mechanism facilitated by proactive local-level participation. As long as all these issues remain unresolved and the beneficiary community is seen as a homogenous entity (targets) waiting desperately for a 'State benefits', access to food shall be a distant dream for the millions of malnourished and hungry.
Notes
This policy paper was written when the author was at the ISS, The Hague, The Netherlands for a Post-graduate Diploma programme in 'Effective Social Policies for Human Development'. Views expressed in this contribution are of the author, and do not in any way represent the views of either HUDCO or ISS.
1. Food Security is 'a State in which at all times, there is enough food in the system. People have both physical and economic access to food. Food that . . . has required nutrition and there is no institutional sanction against accessing the available food' [author's emphasis] (Mukherjee, 2004) . 2. The FCI had two main roles in India's food security policy: (1) increase domestic production to achieve food self-sufficiency; and (2) keep buffer stock inventories in case of failing harvests (Muller and Patel, 2004) . 3. One expert has in a lighter vein estimated that 'if all the sacks of grain were laid up in a row, this would stretch more than one million kilometers, taking us to the moon and back' (Dreze quoted by Sen, 2003) . 4. The PDS was only universal in principal, it was never universal in practice. 5. The need for Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS) was also felt because the PDS as it existed in most parts of India failed to serve the population below the poverty line, had an urban bias, and had negligible coverage in States with the highest concentration of the rural poor and lacked transparency and accountability. 6. As per the High Level Committee Report (HLC, 2002) , headed by Professor Abhijit Sen. 7. The government in 1992 had introduced the Revamped PDS (RPDS). The RPDS relied on geographical targeting, being introduced with universal coverage in only 1775 blocks in poor areas -mainly tribal and hilly, drought prone and remotely located areas. Lee et al. (2002) . 28. As quoted in Vidya Sagar (2003) . 29. Interestingly in 2001 millions of tonnes of rotting grain were thrown into the sea, while starvation deaths were reported in several States (Muller and Patel, 2004) . 30. See http://www.righttofoodindia.org for details. 31. Using the National Sample Survey household consumption data for 1993-4, they compared the utilization of the PDS in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. While estimating targeting errors the study also does not take into account that section of the population who for some reason or the other does not buy wheat or rice from any source. 32. The study points out that the geographical coverage of PDS retail outlets in Andhra Pradesh was almost universal whereas the coverage in Maharashtra was not so. 33. In Maharashtra about 30 per cent of the poor (defined as the bottom 40 per cent) are excluded from the PDS because of incomplete coverage. 34. However, at 23 per cent the exclusion errors are fairly large even in Andhra Pradesh, which implies that there was several problems with the delivery mechanism, which are later discussed in the article. 35. On the other hand the costs of wrong inclusion only have financial implications. 36. Poverty in India is officially measured in terms of monthly per capita expenditure of Rs. 49 in rural areas and Rs. 57 in urban areas at 1973-7 all-India prices, which could then 'buy' an energy consumption of 2400 calories/day in rural areas and 2100/day in urban. Official statistics suggest that 26.1 per cent of the population in 1999-2000 fell below this poverty line, but more realistic estimates put this at around 30 per cent (Deaton and Drèze, 2002) . 37. Comparable estimates of Planning Commission of India, GoI. 38. Strictly not comparable because of changes in the methodology of data collection. 39. Parikh (1998) analyses that 'even a booming domestic economy can aggravate hunger of some poor people if their incomes do not rise as rapidly as increases in food prices because the incomes of others in the economy rise even faster'. 40. It is worthwhile to note that in Kerala only 25 per cent of population has been identified as BPL by the Planning Commission while the Kerala government has identified 42 per cent of households as BPL (HLC, 2002) . In Orissa the State government has estimated that in 1997, 66 per cent of the population was below poverty line (BPL) while the Planning Commission estimated this to be around 48.6 per cent (Sridhar, 2000) . 41. As quoted in Planning Commission (2001). 42. A planning commission study concluded about the vigilance committees in Bihar: 'membership of vigilance committees are seen as positions where money can be made' and '(t)he procedure to appoint them is highly politicized, and mostly clients of MLAs (Members of the state Legislative Assembly) are appointed' (Jenkins and Goetz, 2002) . 43. And not by government officials. 44. For a detailed discussion on geographical targeting at district level see Jha and Srinivasan (2002) . 45. The danger with geographical targeting could be that it may leave out poor people in rich areas.
However, this would have a lesser impact if geographical targeting is done at Taluka/Tehsil or block level. Also geographically targeting reduces a lot of administration costs. 46. For the costs and benefits of self-targeting see Dutta and Ramaswami (2002) and Alderman and Lindert (1998) . For experiments on self-targeting of food subsides in Tunisia see Tuck and Lindert (1996) . 47. This could be viable in rural areas were local staples like jowar, bajara, shorgum, millet are preferred over rice or wheat. 48. An alternative approach to PDS adopted by the Deccan Development Society, Andhra Pradesh provides interesting insights into people's participation. For details see Srinivas and Thaha (2004) . 49. Efforts made by the Mumbai-based Rationing Kruti Samiti (or Action Committee on Rationing) in this direction are laudable (Jenkins and Goetz, 2002) . 50. Report of the Standing Committee of Parliament, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, Food and Public Distribution (2003) .
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